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INTRODUCTION
With disastrous flood events happening more frequently than ever
before and more extreme weather events on the horizon, states have
increased their flood damage mitigation and prevention efforts. According
to the National Conference of State Legislatures, more than 16 states have
enacted legislation regarding new floodplain diversion or storage; more
than 10 states have passed legislation to restore floodplains and streams;
and 19 states in total have passed legislation regarding flood mitigation
efforts. 1 With increased action comes the potential for an increase in
liability.
Much is at stake for these government entities should they be held
liable for flood damage. Between 2015 and 2030, researchers from the
Natural Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predict property
damage losses in the billions. 2 New Jersey is expected to experience a
whopping 10.4 billion dollars’ worth of flood damage by 2030.3 If, for
example, Louisiana were forced to pay its judgments within a certain time
frame, the resulting budget damage could potentially halt flood mitigation
developments for the state. With large damage margins at issue, and
potentially detrimental flood losses on the horizon, this Article will
provide a comparative look at state liability schemes with the following
focus: If a state can be found liable under its own state laws for flood
damage, what are the mechanisms for enforcing judgment?
I. INCREASED LIABILITY, GENERALLY
As a useful backdrop to the discussion of executing judgments, it is
important to consider why and how a government may be found liable for

1. Flood Mitigation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 10, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/flood-mitigation
.aspx [https://perma.cc/6YJM-HWGX].
2. Kristina A. Dahl et al., Effective Inundation of Continental United States
Communities with 21st Century Sea Level Rise, 5 ELEMENTA: SCI. OF THE
ANTHROPOCENE art. 37 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.234 [https://
perma.cc/7MRJ-62R4].
3. Id.
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flood damage. 4 In many instances, government entities themselves create
a higher standard of care for their own actions. For example, many states
now exceed minimum Federal Emergency Management Agency standards
for construction in flood hazard areas. 5 The government is then bound to
follow this increased standard of care.
By providing extra assistance, one theory is that the government
should not be punished with extra liability. The general theory is that if the
government is going above and beyond the call of duty, should it be liable
if extreme weather events put a claimant in the position they would have
been in even in the absence of government intervention? The easiest
example of this theory is a levee breach. Should the government be held
liable if a mechanism, which they had no duty to create, fails, thus flooding
areas which would have naturally flooded in the absence of government
action? The courts seem to answer in the affirmative. Courts have
repeatedly held that once a government decides to engage in mitigation or
prevention efforts, even when doing so in the absence of any duty to do
so, they must exercise reasonable care. 6 Increased government action thus
creates increased risk for liability.
However, overextending liability may deter flood mitigation and
prevention efforts. If the government spends money on these mechanisms
only to impose liability upon itself, the government may simply stop
development altogether. A liability scheme which punishes and thus stifles
protection measures is hardly in line with public policy. This concern was
addressed by a Wisconsin court in regard to a rising lake.7 The court
seemed to apply a notice theory that the government abatement action
should have in and of itself deterred further building of homes and other
development. The court opined that imposing government liability for
unsatisfactory flood abatement efforts “would be to enter a field with no
sensible or just stopping point.” 8 This general principle may serve to
explain the abundant limits on government liability.
In the following sections, this Article will do a state-by-state, then
local government, case study of several states predicted to suffer
detrimental flood damage over the next few years. 9 The aforementioned
4. JOHN KUSLER, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS FOUND., A
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT PUBLIC LIABILITY FOR FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION
(2009).
5. JOHN KUSLER, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION IN FLOOD HAZARD AREAS (2007).
6. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
7. Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 717 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 2006).
8. Id.
9. Dahl et al., supra note 2.
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public policy ideals lay important underpinning to the discussion that is to
follow. Though it appears obvious that someone should be held liable for
flood damage, what becomes apparent is the intense hesitance and
avoidance of placing that liability on the government. It seems that
throughout the varying laws and jurisprudence, a general public policy
exists to promote government activity, and thus limit government liability
in whatever way possible. This idea is reflected well in the various states’
sovereign immunity schemes. Sovereign immunity itself is based on the
age-old English monarchy, with the general policy idea being that “the
Crown can do no wrong.”10 While this archaic ideal is certainly no longer
believed, statutory immunity lives on in varying forms in all of the states
to be discussed below.
While overall government liability for flood is a fascinating topic, and
has been well-researched by others, 11 the rest of this Article will focus on
how states limit their own accountability even if liability has been found.
Even when governments are found liable, enforcement mechanisms
against the state often provide other, oftentimes impossible, hurdles for
plaintiffs.
II. LIMITED FEDERAL LIABILITY
As another essential backdrop to a discussion on state liability, it is
important to recognize the severe limitations to federal liability for flood
damage. Federal liability may arise in the instance of federal constructions
and flood mitigation efforts. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946,
which is often the model for many states’ waiver of statutory immunity,
the federal government can be sued for some types of negligence. 12
However, the federal government’s waiver of immunity is limited to
“nondiscretionary” negligence. This means that actions which are part of
the general policing power of the federal government remain immune to
suit. Many decisions regarding flood mitigation, such as the decision
whether to open a dam, are considered discretionary decisions and thus
remain immunized from liability under federal law. “Nondiscretionary”
actions often are limited to negligent design or maintenance of flood
control operations, so many of the cases regarding flood damage are based
off of those and similar claims.
The gray area between discretionary and nondiscretionary actions is
an important one because it provides the most room for legal argument and
10. ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT (1927).
11. KUSLER, supra note 5.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018).
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artistry. The best example of this is through the Hurricane Katrina canal
breaches litigation. 13 Plaintiffs claimed that a failure to maintain and safely
operate the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet canal constituted gross
negligence which resulted in plaintiff’s losses. The district court awarded
plaintiffs approximately $720,000 in damages. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers successfully appealed the decision by arguing that their actions
were “discretionary” and thus subject to exemption under the Federal
Torts Claims Act.14 This distinction between discretionary and
“nondiscretionary” is mirrored in all of the states discussed below, and is
an important rule to note in considering the high limitations on finding or
asserting liability against a government entity.
In further limitation of potential liability, the federal government
specifically exempted federal agencies from any negligence related to
construction of flood control operations.15 The Flood Control Act of 1928
exempts the federal government for negligence associated with flood
control measures, including design, operation, and maintenance. The law
states that “(n)o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.” 16
The Flood Control Act of 1928 exemplifies the very public policy
concerns which underlie all flood control projects: the goal to protect the
public and enhance flood mitigation efforts while avoiding the potential
liability that may follow. Many mitigation efforts themselves are a huge
economic undertaking. At the time, the Flood Control Act was the largest
public works project ever taken on by the United States as it sought to
prevent flooding along the entire Mississippi River Valley.17 The project
was estimated to cost $325 million at its time, so the government was
understandably concerned with protecting itself from any costs associated
with later findings of liability. 18
While these laws broadly exempt the federal government from
liability, they do not bar takings claims. The same is true for all of the
states in the forthcoming sections. However, takings claims are not an easy
“get around” to general statutory immunity. More often than not, these
claims are largely unsuccessful for a myriad of reasons. Generally, to
succeed in a takings claim, the property owner faces a huge burden of
13. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 732
(E.D. La. 2009), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012).
14. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 450 (5th Cir. 2012).
15. Act of May 15, 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 (popularly called the Flood
Control Act of 1928).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018).
17. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986).
18. Id. at 607–08.
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proof; they must show a loss of all economic value to the property.19
Further, public rights often supersede any private rights to the property.
As a result, many claimants are forced to seek damages through tort law
within the limited exceptions to statutory immunity.
The result of the federal law, which immunizes the government from
most flood claims, is a swell of lawsuits at the state and local levels, which
may explain why executing judgments against many of the following
states appears at times impossible.
III. STATE LIABILITY
A. Louisiana (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $2.6 Billion)
Louisiana is infamous for failing to pay judgments rendered against
it. 20 The Louisiana Constitution contains an appropriations clause which
limits payouts significantly. 21 It bars regular mechanisms for the
enforcement of judgments against the state. Property which is owned by a
public entity in any capacity is not subject to seizure or sale in the way a
normal defendant’s property might be. 22 This is logical as allowing for the
seizure and sale of government property would be absurd and detrimental
to the state.
Instead, the Louisiana Constitution and Revised Statutes require the
payment be made only from funds the legislature has appropriated for that
purpose. Louisiana Revised Statutes reiterate and further codify this
principle, making it nearly impossible to collect from the state. 23 There is
no time limit for appropriating these funds. 24 Simply put, if these funds are
not appropriated, no remedy exists to compel payment. In this model, even
the successful plaintiff is left unpaid and empty-handed. When the
judgment is for a large number of persons, this is often the case.
For an example of how this legal principle affects the state, look to
Tangipahoa Parish. In 1983, the parish won in a suit against the state for
over $100 million in flood damage amounts. The claim at the time was
that an addition to the interstate acted as a dam, causing blockage which
19. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
20. Louisiana Flood Victims Owed Over $300 Million Sue State, AP NEWS
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/a0cf41397728d00e585816db309700
88 [https://perma.cc/SH9D-N2CA].
21. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C).
22. Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1976).
23. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:5109 (2020).
24. Foreman, 336 So. 2d 986.
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resulted in catastrophic, unprecedented flooding. 25 Though the court
ultimately ruled in the plaintiff’s favor (though over 23 years later), it is a
mischaracterization to say that the plaintiffs were “successful.” To date,
the judgment, which is now worth an estimated $300 million, has not been
paid. $8 million was appropriated for partial payment, but it appears even
when funds are appropriated, the state lacks the mechanisms or structures
necessary for disbursement and distribution of those funds. 26 While the
Louisiana legislature does occasionally appropriate funds for payment of
judgments, they usually only do so in regard to road accidents.27 The
Tangipahoa Parish example serves as the best indicator for how the
legislature will behave when a future flood catastrophe strikes. In that
regard, the future is bleak for flood victims in Louisiana.
While Louisiana’s judgment execution structure is relatively wellknown, this Article will use the predicted property damage rankings from
the Natural Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration study cited at the
start of this Article. 28 The study determined the states with the highest
predicted losses between 2015–2030. This Article will cover several of the
states mentioned in that study and look to their various models for
enforcing judgment against the state. Ultimately, this Article should help
practitioners determine one of the most basic threshold questions in law:
Can the plaintiff recover?
B. Florida (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $7.9 Billion)
Florida’s government liability scheme in relation to flood loss is very
similar to Louisiana. As is the case in many states, though no affirmative
duty exists to provide drainage, the state has jurisprudentially recognized
a duty to maintain and manage such systems once they are provided.29
25. Caroline Grueskin, Tangipahoa Residents' Lawsuit Over I-12's Role in
Flooding Dealt Blow by Louisiana's Top Court, ADVOCATE (Nov. 8, 2017, 7:07
PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/communities/livingston_
tangipahoa/article_af076ce8-c3ec-11e7-9881-1b592275f6cd.html [https://perma
.cc/V756-24R2].
26. Id.
27. Mark Ballard, Louisiana Pays $42 Million to Settle Lawsuits, Many Over
Deadly Accidents on Bad Roads, ADVOCATE (Jun. 24, 2018, 10:15 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_6f4c
ff7c-780b-11e8-bd19-279dc226d0e5.html [https://perma.cc/STA2-FNLP].
28. Dahl et al., supra note 2.
29. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Nanz, 642 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994);
Slemp v. City of N. Miami, 545 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1989); Collazos v. City of
W. Miami, 683 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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However, the courts have also ruled that “upgrading” stormwater systems
is a discretionary rather than “operational” function, and is thus not part of
the government’s duty. 30 While the government maintains sovereign
immunity, the Florida Tort Claims Act consents to the state’s potential
liability for a highly limited number of torts. 31
Sovereign immunity is further expounded upon by Florida Statutes
section 373.443 which provides complete immunity to the state against
claims regarding “[c]ontrol or regulation of stormwater management
systems, dams, impoundments, reservoirs, appurtenant work, or works
regulated under this chapter . . . [or m]easures taken to protect against
failure during emergency.” These laws substantially limit government
liability to takings claims and the limited torts that do not fall within
general statutory immunity. This is similar to—though not nearly as broad
or expansive as—the federal Flood Control Act. If a plaintiff is able,
despite these limitations, to successfully sue the government for flood
damage, they will remain subject to a huge procedural hurdle: the Florida
appropriations clause.
The appropriations scheme in Florida is virtually identical to the one
in Louisiana.32 It provides that the state shall not pay any judgment unless
the legislature appropriates funds for such a purpose. Further, it provides
that the only “remedy” for nonpayment is to petition the legislature to seek
appropriation of funds in fulfillment of the judgment. 33 This provision has
been jurisprudentially understood to limit payment of judgments arising
out of the exercise of the state’s policing powers and does not bar payment
of contract claims. 34
C. California (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $10.3 Billion)
California is another example of where state action results in increased
liability. A California appellate court has even gone so far as to extend
government liability to a flood management system the state did not itself
build. In Paterno v. State of California, the court found that “when a public

30. Thomas Ruppert & Carly Grimm, Drowning in Place: Local Government
Costs and Liabilities for Flooding Due to Sea-level Rise, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2013, at
29.
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(1) (Westlaw 2020).
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.066.
33. Id.
34. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d
1260 (Fla. 2008).
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entity operates a flood management system built by someone else, it
accepts liability as if it had planned and built the system itself.” 35
As in the preceding sections, California maintains a broad statutory
immunity over tort claims. 36 It similarly does not apply to takings claims
or claims of breach of contract. 37 Under the California Government Code,
the state explicitly places immunity on actions which are considered
“discretionary acts.” 38 California courts have interpreted this rule to apply
not to the ministerial decisions that follow policy implementation but
rather to the initial policy decisions. 39 This broad immunity has been
applied to result in dismissal of a claim for intentional breach of a levee
which resulted in severe property damage. 40 Further, the Code immunizes
the state from damages associated with permit issuance and inspections. 41
These limitations reflect what appears to be a push against imposing
liability on the government, and that same underpinning is reflected in the
law regarding execution of judgments.
In California, a similar appropriations clause requires that a state may
not be required by any court to pay or offset any tort liability claim,
settlement, or judgment, unless the legislature authorizes the payment of
that specific judgment, or the director of finance or director of
transportation certifies that a sufficient appropriation for the payment
exists. 42 The law does not provide for the normal methods of enforcing
judgments like levying of property, etc. In the event no sufficient
appropriation exists, the attorney general must report the judgment either
to the senate appropriations committee or the assembly committee on ways
and means, whose job it is to introduce legislation which would
appropriate such funds.43
California law does impose a time limit, however. Government
entities are required to budget for the payment of judgments during the
fiscal year they were rendered. 44 If they cannot, they must do so within the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
1998).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Paterno v. State, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815 (Westlaw 2020).
Id.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.2.
Odello Bros. v. Cty. of Monterey, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903 (Cal. Ct. App.
Id.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 818.4.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 965.2.
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 965.
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 970.5.
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following year. Further, if the judgment is made in installments, those
installments cannot span over ten years in total. 45
These acts may be properly compelled through a writ of mandate. 46
The writ of mandate may compel the legislature to undertake the steps
listed above but may not in and of itself compel the legislature to
appropriate funds or make a payment or offset. 47 If the writ of mandate
proves unsuccessful, the proper remedy for local entities is to have them
held in contempt of court pursuant to the California Code of Civil
Procedure. 48 While this has been successfully done to compel local
government entities to pay, 49 it is unclear if this is a precedent or practiced
way to compel judgments rendered against the state itself.
D. New York (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $3.7 Billion)
New York and its communities have no affirmative duty to prevent or
mitigate flood damages. 50 New York has partially waived its sovereign
immunity through the Court of Claims Act.51 This waiver broadly allows
the state to be held liable under the same rules of law which could be
applied to corporations or individuals. However, the state maintains its
immunity for “error in judgment by an officer of the state in the
performance of a duty involving a function that is intrinsically
governmental.” 52 This would likely limit any claims which involve
government discretion regarding flood mitigation or prevention efforts.
New York does not allow the regular procedures for enforcement of
money judgements to be rendered against the state.53 New York has an
appropriations clause which provides for an official whose sole duty it is
to present judgments to the state’s budget-making authority for inclusion
in the appropriation of funds. 54 When or if the state fails to make a
payment, the proper remedy is a mandamus proceeding. 55 New York’s

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 970.6.
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 965.7.
Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 128(a)(4), 129(a)(5) (Westlaw 2020).
Joseph v. S.F. Hous. Auth., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 76 N.E. 738, 740 (N.Y. 1906).
62 N.Y. JUR. 2D Government Tort Liability § 3 (2019).
Id.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52 § 5207 (McKinney 1962).
Id.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78.
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unique enforcement mechanism places a direct threat of liability on
whichever state official is charged with the duty to make the payment. 56
E. Texas (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $1.2 Billion)
Texas is different from the states discussed in prior sections because
it follows a model strikingly similar to the federal model. That is, while
other states somewhat limit government liability, Texas dramatically
limits liability only to inverse condemnation (takings) and nuisance
claims. The Texas Tort Claims Act creates government immunity which
bars a claim for negligence absent certain exceptions which are
inapplicable in the flooding context. The Texas Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that, to the extent claims are based on the state’s negligent
performance of government functions, the government is immune from
liability for property damage. 57
While nuisance claims are exempted, the act specifically maintains
government immunity for a claim for nuisance which results from the
release of water. 58 While takings claims are the main, if not only, remedy
available for flood damage caused by state action or inaction, these claims
are further limited to those takings which are recurrent. Texas courts have
explicitly stated that a single flood event does not rise to the level of a
taking.59
The extremely narrow liability model provides an important context
for understanding Texas law in regard to executing judgments against the
state. The Texas Code provides that a judgment not payable by an insurer
need not be paid by a government unit until the first fiscal year following
the fiscal year in which the judgment becomes final. The government thus
has a year or two at maximum to settle or pay their judgment. This is likely
possible due to the low level of liability possible for government entities
under Texas law.
F. Alabama (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $1.23 Billion)
Alabama has a traditional sovereign immunity scheme codified in its
state constitution.60 This sovereign immunity is waived, however, for
inverse condemnation claims. 61 Alabama imposes a strict limit on
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52 § 5207.
City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504 (Tex. 1997).
Wickham v. San Jacinto River Auth., 979 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App. 1998).
City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004).
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Ala. Dep’t of Transp. v. May, 985 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 2007).
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government entity liability for tort actions. While it does not appear to
limit the way with which judgments are executed, the law prohibits any
action which would result in the “plaintiff’s recovery of money from the
state.” 62 This dramatically limits property damage claims against the
government. The code also states that, even if a claimant were able to
successfully bring forth a claim against the state, the maximum amount
recoverable for property damage is $100,000 for a single occurrence. 63
G. North Carolina (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $1.5 Billion)
North Carolina has partially waived its statutory immunity through its
State Tort Claims Act. 64 This allows the state to be sued, though it differs
from other states in that it provides for a separate mechanism for hearing
claims against the state. The law provides that the “North Carolina
Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of
hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State.” 65 The rule allows
the commission to hear claims of negligence relating to flood activity.
However, the state does not allow action against the state for damages
sustained due to injury or property damage in relation to a structure or
obstruction which was permitted by the state. 66
In North Carolina, no judgment against the state may be collectible
unless the legislature appropriates funds which can be used to pay the
obligation. 67 Further, the maximum amount that the State may pay to all
claimants for any one occurrence is $1,000,000. This cap could be
detrimental to a class action claim for mass flood damage. Further, under
the State Tort Claims Act, post-judgment interest may not be assessed
against the state. 68
North Carolina statutory immunity does not excuse the state for
inverse condemnation claims, and the court has noted that a claim for
negligence under the State Tort Claims Act is not barred by res judicata,
even if the same occurrence was tried in an inverse condemnation claim. 69
In Pate v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, the court held
62. Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995).
63. ALA. CODE § 11-93-2 (Westlaw 2020).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 143-291 to 143-300.1a (Westlaw 2020).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-291.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.60.
67. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 418 (N.C. 1976).
68. Myers v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 313 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984).
69. Pate v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 626 S.E.2d 661 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).

2021]

HELD ACCOUNTABLE

399

that property owners could sue for negligent drainage which caused
flooding, despite having already sued under an inverse condemnation
theory. 70 This was due to the unique jurisdictional scheme in North
Carolina. The plaintiffs in the above-mentioned matter could not bring the
action for tort in the state’s Superior Court because the legislature
conferred exclusive jurisdiction of those claims to the Industrial
Commission. 71
H. Maryland (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $2 Billion)
Maryland has partially waived its statutory immunity through the
Maryland Tort Claims Act. 72 This act, unlike others discussed, creates an
overlap between the law on executing judgments against the state and the
laws which provide basis to sue the state in general. In Maryland, even if
a statute explicitly waives immunity for a certain cause of action against
the state, that action may only be brought if (1) “funds [are] available for
the satisfaction of the judgment,” or (2) the agency sued has the
power/capability “for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery
against it.”73 As is the case in many other states, Maryland has a cap for
compensatory damages at $400,000 maximum per a single claimant and a
single occurrence. 74 By waiving statutory immunity only where it can be
shown that funds for payment exist, Maryland has substantially limited
claims which may be brought against the state.
However, Maryland is unique in that its laws do not merely pass along
the issue of state liability to the will and whim of the legislature. Rather,
the Maryland Tort Claims Act sets forth lengthy procedural preconditions
to suit creating the possibility for insurance payment and settlement. Such
prerequisites contemplate that the state treasurer, not the legislature, will
bear the deciding power as to whether such claims may be covered. 75 First,
the claimant must give notice to the state treasurer within one year after

70. Id.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-291.
72. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (Westlaw 2020).
73. See Univ. of Md. v. Maas, 197 A. 123, 125 (Md. 1938); see also Bd. of
Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coll. v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 366 A.2d 360, 366 (Md. 1976).
74. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(a)(1)–(2) (Westlaw 2020).
A recent 2021 amendment adjusts the limits in this section, but only for torts
committed by law enforcement officers. Maryland Police Accountability Act of
2021, 2021 Md. Laws ch. 59.
75. Karen J. Kruger, Governmental Immunity in Maryland: A Practitioner’s
Guide to Making and Defending Tort Claims, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 55 (2006).
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the injury to person or property. 76 The notice of claim must set forth the
basis of the claim and the facts underlying the same. Such notice provides
information necessary to determine whether the claim is covered by any
active insurance policies, whether the state needs Attorney General
representation, and whether the claim should be settled. 77 “In every budget
bill since the enactment of the MTCA, the General Assembly and the
Governor have deposited finds into the [State Insurance Trust Fund,]”
intended to compensate future claimants. 78
I. New Jersey (Estimated Loss Between 2015–2030: $10.4 Billion)
New Jersey is the state most prone to flood loss in the upcoming years
at a whopping $10.4 billion in predicted losses between 2015 and 2030. It
recently passed a bill to appropriate $3.054 million to acquire properties
throughout the state that are prone to or have incurred flood or storm
damage, or that could act as a buffer to protect other lands from flood
damage as part of its Blue Acres program. 79 This program hopes to avoid
future repair and mitigation costs by simply buying flood prone lands for
other uses.80
New Jersey has a generic Tort Claims Act which provides general
immunity from tort liability. 81 Further, the law explicitly immunizes the
state for liability related to permitting and inspections.82 The state
constitution has an appropriations clause which provides that no money
shall be drawn from the state but for appropriations. 83 While the language
does not expressly bar the normal execution of judgments, it has been
jurisprudentially understood to limit enforcement mechanisms in a way
similar to the other states discussed prior. 84 The New Jersey Supreme
Court has stated that the “judiciary could not order the Legislature to
appropriate money, or the Governor to approve an appropriation if one

76. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-106(b)(1) (Westlaw 2020).
77. Kruger, supra note 75, at 55 (citing Johnson v. Md. State Police, 628 A.2d
162, 166–67 (Md. 1997)).
78. Id. at 57.
79. Flood Mitigation, supra note 1.
80. Blue Acres Floodplain Acquisitions, ST. OF N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
PROTECTION, https://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/blue_flood_ac.html [https://per
ma.cc/L9RD-5LN6] (last updated Apr. 1, 2021).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (Westlaw 2020).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:2-5 to :2-6.
83. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2.
84. Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 219 A.2d 512, 514 (N.J. 1966).
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were made . . . [n]or would it do to issue a writ of execution” against state
property. 85
The proper procedure for executing judgments is to submit a sort of
supplemental application to the state treasury for determination that the
appropriation can and should be made. 86 The court has recognized an
exception to the general principle that the court cannot enforce
judgments. 87 The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that if there is
a constitutional right to the funds, the court may compel payment even in
the absence of the appropriation of funds. 88 While this may seem like a get
around to the general rule, it is not unlike the other states which generally
allow for enforcement of certain types of claims including breach of
contract and takings.
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY, GENERALLY
While state immunity may appear strict, states uniformly extend this
statutory immunity to localities and municipalities. This may be
particularly harmful to plaintiffs as many of the decisions and efforts
directly affecting flood control or mitigation measures are done at the
municipal level. Some states simply include municipalities under their
general sovereign immunity statute. Florida follows this model. However,
in several of the above-researched states, local and municipality liability
is limited through various mechanisms.
Treatment of municipalities in California varies with little consistency
among courts. Several cases found municipalities liable for interaction
with privately owned drainage systems, 89 while other cases required the
municipality actually own the offending drainage system. 90 Overall,
California seems to follow a stricter model for its municipalities, meaning
the state appears more willing to allow for liability against municipalities
for flood damage. As discussed in the earlier section, California allows
judgments against local governments to be properly compelled through a
writ of mandate.91 If the writ of mandate proves unsuccessful, the proper
remedy for local entities is to have them held in contempt of court pursuant
85. Id.
86. City of E. Orange v. Palmer, 245 A.2d 327 (N.J. 1968).
87. Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
88. Id.
89. Marin v. City of San Rafael, 168 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
90. Ullery v. Contra Costa Cty., 248 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Yox
v. City of Whittier, 227 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
91. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 965.7 (Westlaw 2020).
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to the California Code of Civil Procedure. 92 Further, in 2019, California
enacted legislation which would require a city or county to include
information identifying residential developments in hazard areas that do
not have at least two emergency evacuation routes. 93
New York limits liability through a heightened burden of proof. The
law bars any finding of liability against a local entity unless four criteria
are met: (1) assumption of the duty through either undertaking action or
efforts, or through an existing affirmative duty; (2) knowledge that part or
all of the local government entity’s actions could lead to some harm; (3)
some form of direct contact between the local government entity or agents
and the injured person or persons; and (4) that person’s justified reliance
on the local government entity’s action or inaction. 94
Texas explicitly allows for municipalities to be held liable for
“governmental functions,” which include a listed variety of activities
including street construction and design, dams and reservoirs, zoning and
planning, engineering functions, and more. 95 The law does not, however,
apply to create liability to what are deemed “proprietary functions.” These
include operation and maintenance of utilities. This bifurcation is a mirror
image of the “discretionary” and “nondiscretionary” distinction within
federal law.
By comparison, other states have heightened burdens of proof which
are not as difficult to meet. While Alabama maintains a level of immunity
for municipalities, it allows for liability in the instance of “neglect,
carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the
municipality.” 96
New Jersey law generously provides immunity to local governments
and municipalities. In Panepinto v. Edmart, Inc., a New Jersey appellate
court dealt with a claim for negligent maintenance of sewers and
drainage. 97 The claimants sued the city planning board and city engineer
for damage sustained when the sewers backed up during heavy rainfall,
resulting in flooding to numerous houses in New Jersey. The court held
that decisions made in good faith and in the exercise of discretionary and
quasi-judicial functions were protected by sovereign immunity even when
those actions were proven negligent.98
92.
93.
94.
95.
2020).
96.
97.
98.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 128(a)(4), (a)(5) (Westlaw 2020).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65302(g)(5) (Westlaw 2021).
Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(1)–(36) (Westlaw
ALA. CODE § 11-47-190 (Westlaw 2020).
Panepinto v. Edmart, Inc., 323 A.2d 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
Id. at 536–37.
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V. WHERE DOES THE LIABILITY GO?
With more dramatic and frequent flood events on the horizon, litigants
will need to search for more creative ways to assess damages for flood
loss. The government is well-insulated on all levels against liability for
flood damage. Perhaps in light of this, it appears there may be an uptick in
recognizing new theories of liability for flood-related action at the
jurisprudential level. When federal law protected the government from
liability, the states mirrored their policies to avoid the overflow. If not the
government, then who will bear the loss? It seems, now, landowners and
professionals may bear the burden.
For example, courts have begun to recognize causes of action between
landowners that they did not before. 99 The traditional “common enemy”
doctrine allowed landowners relatively unrestricted use of their own lands,
including leveeing, grading, diking, and other mechanisms they may wish
to undertake to protect their own property. The landowner could do as they
wished to protect themselves while being protected from liability if their
actions resulted in damage to the other landowners. That doctrine has been
jurisprudentially erased and replaced by the “reasonable use doctrine”
which imposes liability on a landowner for any activity which may
unreasonably affect the flooding of a neighboring landowner’s property. 100
The more likely result, however, is an uptick in lawsuits against the
professionals hired to perform such government functions. The reasonable
use doctrine extends to professionals. Further, more than 20,000 local and
state governments have adopted exhaustive regulatory standards for new
structures and their impact on displacement of water and flood risk.101
Such standards, as well as the industry-specific customs for engineering
design likely create clear basis for claims of negligence. Outside and in
addition to the letter of the law, contracts themselves are likely to function
as a burden-shifting mechanism for government entities to avoid liability.
For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that where an engineering
company entered into a contract with the local municipality, the company
“undertook the duty the County owed to downstream property owners in
connection with the design of the new bridge.” 102
Burden-shifting to private contractors presents significant public
policy concerns. A legal regime which creates disproportionate recovery
99. E.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d
681 (Mo. 1993) (en banc), abrogated by Southers v. City of Farmington, 263
S.W.3d 603 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
100. Id.
101. KUSLER, supra note 5.
102. Johnson v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 913 P.2d 119, 130 (Kan. 1996).
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against third parties “would have a chilling effect on innovation and would
tend to deter creativity.”103 Further, professional liability insurance rates
are rising concurrently with a rise in claims. 104 While professional liability
insurance is available to those practicing architecture or engineering
design, a significant number of practitioners do not and cannot afford to
carry coverage. 105 Worse still, this lack of coverage is often rationalized
as a means to avoid litigation. 106 Thus, claims for flood liability at the
private level suffer similar threats to recovery.
CONCLUSION
While statutory immunity coupled with limited enforcement
mechanisms may appear a harsh reality for persons who fall victim to
flood losses, the alternative may even be harsher. With increased flood risk
in mind, many governments at the federal, state, and local level are
spending more than ever to prevent future flood losses. Miami Beach
recently released plans to spend more than $200 million to expand the
city’s drainage system. 107 Further, the government at multiple levels is, in
addition, spending enormous amounts of money on disaster relief. The
Center for American Progress found that Congress spent at least $136

103. Kenneth R. Michael, Design Professional Liability: A Balanced
Framework for Third-Party Actions by Tenants and Users, CONSTRUCTION LAW.,
Aug. 1994, at 8, 14 (citing Anthony F. Earley, Liability of Architects and
Engineers to Third Parties: A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 306, 317
(1977)).
104. See AMES & GOUGH, PLI MARKET 2021: AS CLAIMS EXPERIENCE
DETERIORATES, INSURERS SEEK NEW RATE HIKES (2021), https://amesgough
.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/AG-Market-Survey-2021.pdf [https://perma.c
c/92WG-ENMY].
105. Michael, supra note 103, at 16 (citing Jeffrey L. Nischwitz, The
Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity: Evolution and Expansion of the
Liability to Third Parties, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 217, 260 (1984)).
106. Id. (citing JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE,
ENGINEERING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 337 (4th ed. 1989)).
107. Curtis Morgan, Deep Trouble: How Sea-Rise Could Cause Havoc in
South Florida, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 12, 2013, 10:37 AM), https://www.miami
herald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1948068.html [https://per
ma.cc/QNF5-CLTJ].
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billion on disaster relief between 2011 and 2013 alone. 108 These payments
are usually under-budgeted and thus must come out of deficit spending.109
If a method existed to execute judgments in the traditional sense, it is
not difficult to imagine the absurd and detrimental results. A state could
not sustain a model where a citizen could place a lien on the state hospital,
for example. Even if states and localities were forced to pay monetary
damages, the payments would interfere with the public funds currently
used to mitigate future disasters. As harsh as the reality may seem for
claimants, the limitations on liability and executing judgments, even if
liability is found, are likely more beneficial to the citizenry as a whole
when compared to an outright limitless stream of state or local payouts.
As mentioned in the above, professional liability appears to be another,
albeit less-straightforward dead end to recovery.
Rather than continue this legal game of hot potato, the government
owes a level of respect and responsibility to its people for a steadily
increasing risk. Such credence is best demonstrated by the law in
Maryland. There, while the government recognizes the logical limits to
government liability, the government also recognizes that it may and
eventually will be at fault in some way. Rather than require the legislature
to appropriate funds for past due judgments, Maryland has a designated
State Insurance Fund for claims against it.110 Though liability is capped
and such claims are subject to rigorous procedural requirements, the
existence of the Fund indicates a concern and regard for government
actions and their effect on citizenry.111 Further, similar policy in no way
removes the existing standards for professionals. Rather, the law appears
to be the most honest, fair way to balance a government’s need to maintain
its economy with the public’s need to be compensated when injured.
With flood an increasing concern for our country, the public cannot be
expected to bear total losses and devastating flood damage on its own. This
is a particularly concerning concept in light of the literature regarding who
is likely to bear the brunt of such flood losses. 112 Simply put, those most
108. Brad Plumer, The Government Is Spending Way More on Disaster Relief
Than Anybody Thought, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2013, 7:45 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/04/29/the-government-is-spend
ing-way-more-on-disaster-relief-than-anybody-thought/ [https://perma.cc/ETT2JSLV].
109. Id.
110. Kruger, supra note 75, at 55–56.
111. Id.
112. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., GREATER
IMPACT: HOW DISASTERS AFFECT PEOPLE OF LOW SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
(2017).
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likely to be impacted by flood are those who are least likely to have the
means to afford rehousing or restoration. 113 It is incumbent upon
government at all levels to anticipate flood hazards and dedicate the proper
resources to both prevent and compensate for losses when held liable. It is
incumbent that where the law holds a party accountable, they fulfill their
liability.

113. Id. at 6–8.

